

20 December 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
ATTENTION : [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
DDI Planning Officer
SUBJECT : Planning FY1972-FY1976

1. There is an essential continuity in the evolution of the plans affecting the future development of an Office like OSR. What I wrote in my 16 December 1968 memorandum on planning for FY1971-FY1975 still largely applies. I said, "As I see it, the resources of the Office of Strategic Research today are deficient in almost every area of its responsibilities." That is still my view. I said, "Resources for the production of intelligence, in the military field, continue to be badly out of balance with the very large resources devoted to collection and processing....I am particularly concerned about this imbalance as I look ahead to the impressively large collection programs which are on stream for the early 1970's." They still are, and I still am.

25X1X4 2. Of course, there have been changes since last year's planning memorandum. SALT has become a reality and the demands of preparing for [REDACTED] 25X1X4 [REDACTED] the strategic arms talks have required massive and continuing investments of personnel resources in OSR, almost all of them at the expense of the Office's responsibilities for intelligence analysis and production. We have created an Asian Communist Forces Division, somewhat ahead of the schedule foreseen a year ago. Faced with the need for more analytical resources on Soviet and Chinese forces, we have disestablished the branch concerned with Free World advanced weapons capabilities and redistributed the positions.

3. In my memorandum last year, I set forth the rationale for an increase in the number of positions in OSR from 190 in FY1970 to 211 in FY1971 to 222 in FY1972. Had I not believed fully in the justification I then set forth, I would not have made the request.

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After a careful review of the present and future responsibilities of OSR as I understand them from the Deputy Director for Intelligence, I still believe the request remains essentially valid. There is a kind of "natural size" for an organization with a given set of responsibilities. It is my conviction, after two and a half years' experience, that OSR is still significantly below its natural size.

4. Let me assure you, however, that Office Directors--like Supreme Court justices--read the newspapers. I am not in this planning document setting forth formally a plan embracing the number of positions requested a year ago. I believe that the positions requested here are the minimum necessary to meet certain key needs.

5. As I survey the production responsibilities of OSR over the next five years, four needs stand out.

6. Production of military and military-economic intelligence on Soviet and East European forces. Several factors are at work driving the pressures on the Intelligence Directorate--and OSR--for intelligence production and judgments at higher levels of sophistication and precision on these forces. The whole SALT process will have the effect of reshaping to some degree (depending on the outcome of the negotiations) the priorities of intelligence producers and has already begun to require of us the ability to make more finely tuned analytical judgments. Most of the technical collection systems foreseen for the early and mid-Seventies will provide data of most direct interest to the production responsibilities of this Office. Changes in the estimative process as they bear on the major Soviet military estimates are likely to fall particularly on the Office of Strategic Research. And finally, let us note the degree to which the Intelligence Directorate (through the Office of Strategic Research) has become a force within the US Government for the development of new intelligence judgments on Soviet, Chinese, and other military capabilities. In a great variety of organizational contexts--the various SALT bodies, the NSSM working groups, the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, in study groups with Systems Analysis,

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as well as in relations with DIA [REDACTED]--the pressure will be on OSR to provide effective intelligence analysis and judgment on Soviet and East European forces.

7. Production of military and military-economic intelligence on Chinese and North Korean forces.
Two considerations, basically, affect the future needs of the Intelligence Directorate--and OSR--here. The first is the simple fact that our understanding of these forces is greatly imperfect (certainly by comparison with our understanding of Soviet forces). This does not need to be so. But progress will take time and resources. The second is the importance of Communist China over the next decade. Whether considered by itself as an emerging nuclear power or as one third of a US-Sino-Soviet relationship, China is a problem for the Seventies, and we must be ready.

8. Free World advanced weapon capabilities.
The Soviets have shown by their remarks in the preliminary SALT talks at Helsinki that the possible effect of third country nuclear capabilities on the US-USSR strategic relationship concerns them greatly. This is to some degree a matter of Communist China, but not exclusively. France, the UK, Israel, Japan, Sweden, India, all are countries which have or can have a nuclear strike capability. All are countries whose nuclear capabilities--actual or potential--affect the work that OSR is responsible for. In the FY1972-FY1976 planning period, more of these countries will have assimilated the technology associated with nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. I believe OSR should be better prepared than it now is to be able to contribute effectively to likely future intelligence needs in this area.

9. Automation, the intelligence process, and OSR.
Last year I wrote:

"Throughout the planning process, I have assumed that OSR will pursue a vigorous program to incorporate automated techniques into the total analytical process. We must do this and we must do it successfully if OSR is to have

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advanced significantly in the military analytical field by FY1975. There are not enough personnel resources available to the Intelligence Directorate for OSR to enable us to meet our objectives solely through an increase in people."

In addition, I included a substantial section (beginning on page 5 of the Annex to my memorandum) concerning the application of automatic data processing equipment and techniques to the intelligence process. I want now only to reaffirm the essential validity of that statement. Although some of the particulars may have changed, the broad outline of the OSR plan to develop an all-source automated data base and use it as part of the operational routine of OSR analysts is still sound. OSR will continue to work closely with the DDI Planning Staff for the accomplishment of this plan.

10. I shall be pleased to discuss any questions you may have on the matters raised in this planning paper. OSR is the Intelligence Directorate's point of responsibility for a major area of activity within the intelligence community and within the US Government. This is an area of increasing supply (in the form of future collection systems) and growing demand (for more data, for more advanced analysis, on a broader range of questions). With the right balance of resources, we can do the job.

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BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research

Attachment:

Annex

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ANNEX

SUBJECT: Office of Strategic Research Program Plans
for FY1972-FY1976

1. The planning objectives of OSR for the period FY1972-FY1976 that call for additional personnel and funds over those previously allocated concern measures:

- to improve the production of intelligence on operational capabilities of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces.
- to provide more detailed military-economic analysis of Soviet, East European, and Chinese military programs and forces.
- to reestablish research analysis on the advanced weapons programs of selected Free World countries.

2. These objectives are discussed in further detail below. No significant changes in OSR management support activities, including ADP applications, are anticipated at this time.

3. It is agreed between the Director of Current Intelligence and the Director of Strategic Research that the responsibility for analysis of and reporting on North Vietnamese military forces will, at an appropriate time, transfer to OSR from OCI. For planning purposes, FY1972 is used in this paper as that time and a shift of two positions is used as the number of positions involved.

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Planning Objectives

4. Objective: Produce more definitive intelligence analysis on the capabilities of Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic and general purpose forces.

As a result of years of concentrated attention, comprehensive intelligence data bases on Soviet strategic and general purpose forces are now available. To provide consumers--particularly those on the White House Staff and in the Department of Defense--with detailed information and refined analysis on force capabilities, we are working more and more on assessing the implications of the qualitative as well as the quantitative aspects of Warsaw Pact military forces. Definitive answers to important policy questions on Soviet and Warsaw Pact capabilities--especially those relating to Soviet intentions toward NATO, the Middle East, and Communist China--depend on more effective use and broader analysis of the highly detailed information bases that have been developed.

5. Objective: Provide more detailed military-economic data and analysis of Soviet, East European, and Chinese military programs and forces.

Military analysis of the USSR is supported by an already developed but still rapidly expanding body of evaluated information on Soviet military programs and forces. Detailed data bases for East European and Chinese forces are now being developed and their exploitation will make possible more meaningful assessments and conclusions concerning the forces and programs of these countries and their military-economic aspects. With the establishment of the Asian Communist Forces Division in OSR, it will be possible to concentrate increasingly on developing and

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exploiting a military-economic data base on Communist China. The goal is to be able soon to address the military programs on East European countries in detailed military-economic terms, and to be able to do the same thing for Communist China in about two years.

6. Objective: To reestablish research analysis on the advanced weapons capabilities and forces of selected Free World countries.

A number of industrially advanced nations in the Free World have important capabilities for developing or significantly increasing their advanced weapons programs. This in turn affects Soviet (and probably Chinese) attitudes toward the development and deployment of strategic forces and ultimately affects US defense policy planning. For these reasons, we believe that OSR should in FY1973 reestablish a capability to do in-depth research analysis on the strategic programs of the major industrial nations of the Free World. At present, the allocation of OSR resources allows only for current intelligence reporting on third world countries.

7. Resource Requirements: The resource requirements for FY1972-FY1976 as discussed above and shown on the attached summary (Form 258a) reflect the needs of the Office of Strategic Research to reinforce its research analysis on Soviet, East European, and Chinese military forces and to reestablish military and military-economic research analysis on selected Free World countries having advanced weapons capabilities or potential. The specific personnel increases requested for these purposes are:

a. In FY1972:

-One professional to increase the military-economic analysis of Chinese military forces.

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- One professional for research analysis on Soviet strategic attack forces.
- One professional for research analysis on Soviet naval operations.
- One intelligence assistant to support analysts on Soviet strategic defense forces.

b. In FY1973:

- One professional to continue development of military-economic analysis on Soviet and East European forces.
- Two professionals to meet the increased military-economic analysis workload on Asian Communist military forces.
- Four professionals and one clerical to reestablish a branch for research analysis on the advanced weapons capabilities and forces of selected Free World countries.

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